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In this paper we model the e⁄ect of migrant remittances on job creation
and human capital formation, given migration prospects. Model calibration of
deep parameters was performed with data from the AMCO survey on migration
and remittances. The simulations based on the model show that remittances
can have o⁄setting e⁄ects on equilibrium human capital and labor market out-
comes in the country of origin of migrants. First, remittances enhance school-
ing opportunities for recipient households, and human capital formation can be
augmented. Second, an increase in human capital supply by recipient house-
holds induces job creation as labor demand increases in the origin country. If
a su¢ ciently large share of remittance recipients do not migrate, then the net
e⁄ect is brain gain rather than brain drain ensuing remittances. The job cre-
ation spillover in local labor markets increases the rate of return to schooling
for nonrecipient households, whose members are less likely to migrate. As a
result, there are more incentives to substitute consumption for human capital
investment. At the same time, the rise in expected income due to the spillover
induces higher desired consumption. If the ￿ substitution e⁄ect￿outweighs the
￿ income e⁄ect￿ , then remittances will increase overall human capital and re-
duce the unemployment rate. The calibration and simulation analyses suggest
that he net e⁄ect of remittances depends upon the accessibility of education
and the degree and labor market frictions in the origin country as well as the
immigration policy in the destination country of migrants.
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11 Introduction
The impact of migration on both sending and receiving countries has long been re-
searched. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between
migrant remittances and human capital formation under imperfections in the job
matching process. Thus we will analyze the impact of migration on the labor markets
of the sending countries. Di⁄erent forces can a⁄ect the way labor markets perform, es-
pecially when migration occurs between countries at di⁄erent stages of development.
On the one hand, migration from a less to a more developed country a⁄ects natives
in the destination country by introducing more competition in the labor market and
by in￿ uencing the decision of entrepreneurs to o⁄er new job opportunities. On the
other hand, migration can also a⁄ect the labor market in the origin country. First,
migration prospects can in￿ uence the education decision of both migrants and stayers
(Stark et al., 1997, 1998; Beine et al., 2001). Second, when migrants remit part of
their earnings back to their households, they can a⁄ect the consumption, investment
and employment decisions of the recipients. Also, the decision to increase human
capital investments by recipient households generates a job creation externality on
nonrecipient households. As aggregate employment prospects improve in the coun-
try of origin of the migrant, the rise in expected income increases returns to human
capital investments generally. Hence, both aggregate employment and human capital
can rise ensuing migration. However, there can be two mitigating e⁄ects. One due to
the brain drain caused. The other is the wealth e⁄ect associated with remittances,
which, other things equal, makes consumption and leisure more desirable.
Economic analysis of the e⁄ects of remittances has become an important issue
recently because of the rapid growth of this form of ￿nancial ￿ ow. O¢ cial estimates
by the IADB put remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean at around U$ 45.8
billion in 2004, compared to 38 billion in 2003, representing an annual growth rate
of about 20%. But the total amount of remittances, which includes ￿ ows through
uno¢ cial channels, is thought to be greater than this. Even the o¢ cial level of
remittances exceeds the amount of other forms of capital in￿ ows received for many
countries in the region. Since the 1990, the average annual growth rate of remittances
for the region has been 12.4%, which the highest amongst other regions in the World.
At present, Latin America accounts for one third of global remittance ￿ ows.
Remittances are particularly important Colombia where a substantial increase
has been observed since 1999. Emigration drastically accelerated since the 1998-1999
downturn and this explains why remittances rose from US$745 million in 1996 to
US$3.17 billion in 2004, with an average annual growth rate of 25% during this time.
Over the ￿rst quarter of 2005, remittances were 6% larger than the ￿rst quarter of
2004. The ongoing growth of remittances since 1999 has made them one of the most
important items in the balance of payments. Remittances represent four times the
income from co⁄ee exports and exceed by 10% oil exports. At present, remittance
￿ ows are higher than foreign direct investment. The monthly growth of remittances
2has been 2.1% on average since January of 2002 due to increases in both the number of
transactions and the average amount of each transaction. The number of transactions
during the ￿rst half of 2002 was 498,000 and it was 564,000 during the ￿rst half of
2004, a rise in volume of 13.2%. The average remittance rose from US$255 during
the ￿rst half of 2002 to US$287 during the ￿rst half of 2004.
Given the salient and growing macroeconomic in￿ uence of remittances as part
of international capital ￿ ows in Latin America in general, and Colombia in partic-
ular, it is of fundamental importance to assess the general equilibrium e⁄ects of
migrant remittances. In this paper, we analyze the impact of remittances on human
capital in a general equilibrium framework. The basic idea of the model is that mi-
grant remittances can have two opposing e⁄ects on human capital and employment
for both recipient and nonrecipient households. First, for recipient households, re-
mittances from migrants generate funds that enhance schooling opportunities and
potentially generate a brain gain. But, educated remittance recipients could eventu-
ally migrate and cause a brain drain. Second, for nonrecipient households, the job
creation spillover from higher human capital, when there is net brain gain among
recipient households, increases the rate of return to schooling. But, the income e⁄ect
of remittances could increase desired consumption and leisure, thereby reducing hu-
man capital investment. Therefore, the net e⁄ect of remittances on human capital is
far from obvious. In particular, we show that when households are ￿nancially con-
strained, under certain conditions remittances can increase the human capital supply,
and thereby reduce the unemployment rate in the home labor market.
We develop a matching model with frictions in the labor market, giving rise to
search, and with capital market imperfections, giving rise to credit constraints. This
gives us a useful theoretical framework to discriminate between the ￿ productive￿and
￿ unproductive￿uses of remittances. As with any source of wealth, the allocation
of remittances depends on incentives. When education costs are relatively low and
schooling enhances labor market prospects, at home or abroad, the net rate of return
to human capital formation is high. If the net rate of return to human capital for-
mation is high (low), additional remittances are likely to be allocated on the margin
to schooling investments (consumption).
We also consider the e⁄ect of remittances on the unemployment rate of the la-
bor exporting country. Remittances have two opposing e⁄ects on the labour market.
First they augment the pool of funds for recipient households back home. This causes
schooling to rise. Since it is likely that many households in labor exporting coun-
tries are credit constrained, remittances available for schooling investment will then
relax these constraints and increase the level of the human capital stock. The second
e⁄ect is on the return to human capital investment in the country receiving remit-
tances. The e⁄ect of the rise in the human capital supply of households receiving
remittances is to induce job creation, and to reduce the unemployment rate as nonre-
cipient households also increase schooling. As a result of the higher relative return to
education, one e⁄ect is the substitution away from consumption and leisure towards
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site e⁄ect increasing the desirability of consumption and leisure, as they are normal
goods. If the ￿ substitution e⁄ect￿outweighs the ￿ income￿e⁄ect arising from better
opportunities, then remittances will increase human capital supply and reduce the
unemployment rate.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview
of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the e⁄ects of migration on
the welfare of stayers. Section 3 introduces the basic model in which we explore the
e⁄ect of remittances on human capital and labor market outcomes. Section 4 contains
simulation and calibration analyses on the impact of remittances on human capital
and unemployment in Central America. Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
2 Related Literature
In this section we survey the literature on migrant remittances determinants and
e⁄ects in developing countries, with a particular emphasis on the stylized facts that
have emerged from empirical studies.
2.1 Remittances in Colombia
First, we will review a number of recent studies on remittances in Colombia. In
considering the e⁄ect of remittances, Cardona and Medina (2005) assess how the
reception of remittances impacts upon the household composition of expenditures.
They consider whether remittances generate changes in expenditure allocation in four
categories: Consumption, education, healthcare and ￿nancial investment. There is
only evidence of changes in the pattern of expenditure in one item, namely education.
In fact, remittance recipient households spend on average 11% more on education.
Although the net e⁄ect on other items is nil, it may well be that there is an insurance
element associated with remittances as they cover income lost after the severe 1998-
1999 recession.
A possible macroeconomic impact of remittances is pointed out by Cadena and
Cardenas (2004) who consider their role as a money laundering device. The massive
migration ￿ ows, in the wake of the late 1990￿ s downturn, led to workers￿ remit-
tances increasing substantially in recent years in Colombia. While remittances have
improved living standards of recipient households as Cardona and Medina (2005)
quantify, the possibility of use as a vehicle for money laundering is a potential risk.
Colombia heavily regulates these transfers, which do not seem to be more costly than
in other Latin American countries due to competition between intermediaries. How-
ever, the transaction costs associated with remittances compared to other alternative
money laundering schemes make them unlikely as a major source for this use.
Other studies analyze the determinants of remittances in Colombia. For example,
Gaviria and Mejia (2005) study among Colombian emigrants what are the determi-
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return. They use a survey conducted by Radiocadena Nacional de Colombia linking
the characteristics of migrants with those of household members staying behind. The
average amount of remittances is increasing in the years of schooling of the senders
and only decreases very slightly over time. Among receivers, 13% of households report
investing remittances in education as their primary use.
Gaviria (2004) points out that remittances are an option for households with
access to the resources that need to be invested in human capital and to bear the
costs of migration. This points to migration as an option for households, to enhance
income generation and risk diversi￿cation, which is subject to positive selection on
the basis that only those with a minimum human and ￿nancial capital can settle
abroad. Results consistent with the latter characterization are obtained by Soto and
Walker (2002), who analyze the motivations of Colombian migrants in the US. They
￿nd that obtaining higher wages is the primary motivation. In fact, the evidence
points to positive self-selection of migrants as their schooling years and wage before
migration both exceed the national average.
2.2 Remittances as Insurance
Now, we turn to studies of remittances in other developing countries. A fruitful way
to assess the economic role of remittances is to rely on household surveys and estimate
the proportion of households for which remittances are an important source of income.
Such surveys tend to show that remittances are often a crucial element of survival
and livelihood strategies for many (typically rural) poor households. For example,
Rodriguez (1996) reports that 17% of Philippines households receive income transfers
from abroad, representing 8% of national income. Similarly, Cox, Eser and Jimenez
(1998) found that 25% of Peruvian households receive private transfers (mainly re-
mittances), representing 22% of their incomes. On a more reduced scale, de la BriŁre
et al. (2002) show that approximately 40% of the households in the Dominican Sierra,
a poor rural region of the Dominican Republic, have migrant members, 52% of whom
are sending remittances.
In the context of Central America, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) ￿nd for El
Salvador that 14% of rural and 15% of urban households received remittances from
friends and relatives abroad in 1997. These studies, as well as many others de-
tailed below, show that remittances are instrumental to achieving mutual insurance,
consumption smoothing, and alleviation of liquidity constraints. In another study,
Funkhouser (1995) study compares remittances to the capital cities of El Salvador and
Nicaragua. In this study, Funkhouser noted that while the number of migrants and
the general economic conditions prevailing in the two countries during the 1980s were
quite similar, twice as many households received remittances from relatives abroad
in San Salvador than in Managua; moreover, for those who received remittances, the
average transfer received in San Salvador was twice as high as that in Managua. Us-
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many similarities between the two pools of migrants with respect to age, education,
gender, and, to a lesser extent, number of years since emigration. In other words,
di⁄erences in remitting behavior could not be accounted for by di⁄erences in house-
holds or migrants observed characteristics, including the timing of migration. By
contrast, the estimation of remittance functions revealed substantial di⁄erences in
remitting behavior between the two samples, allowing to conclude that di⁄erences in
unobserved characteristics (i.e., how remitters self-select with the pool of migrants)
are central to explaining inter-country di⁄erences in remittance behavior. Remitters
were negatively selected out of the pool of emigrants, but in a more pronounced way
for Nicaragua, meaning that the more educated Salvadorans tend to have stronger
motives and/or opportunities to remit. Remittances were negatively correlated to
years since emigration for both immediate family members and other relative emi-
grants in Nicaragua but not for Salvadorans, suggesting higher propensities to return
among the latter.
2.3 Remittances and Education
The relationship between remittances and education has been explored in the litera-
ture, with particular attention to the e⁄ect on the decisions of members of recipient
households. The ￿rst possible link between remittances and education is through the
repayment of informal loans.1 A natural interpretation is that the prospect of migra-
tion makes education a pro￿table investment for the family. Hence, migration fosters
human capital formation provided that not too many educated individuals emigrate
out of the country. In this case, remittances are a ￿nancial arrangement to make
possible the materialization of the brain gain brought about by migration prospects.
An alternative is that the migrant rather than being the borrower as above is,
in some sense, the lender. Along the lines suggested in the theoretical model of
remittances and liquidity constraints in this paper, a second possible link between
remittances and education must be considered as remittances also ￿nance education
for the migrants￿household members who stayed back home. Given the relatively
high income elasticity of education, one would expect remittances to have signi￿cant
positive e⁄ects on the educational attainments of members from households with mi-
grant members. Notwithstanding, as Hanson and Woodru⁄ (2002) point out, such
households are also often characterized by the absence of one parent. Since recent re-
search on education indicates that this could be detrimental to the children￿ s schooling
achievements, the overall e⁄ect on educational attainments is a priori unclear.
Few studies have looked for evidence on this potential forward linkage between
remittances and education. In fact, the only works on remittances and investments
in human capital we are aware of are the study by Cardona and Medina (2005)
1A number of empirical case studies con￿rm that, in many instances, remittances may be seen
as repayment of loans used to ￿nance educational investments.
6reviewed above, two recent studies on Mexico by Lopez-Cordova (2004) and Hanson
and Woodru⁄ (2002), and one by Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) on El Salvador,
which contribute towards documenting the potential growth e⁄ects of remittances
through human capital formation. First, as pointed out above, Cardona and Medina
(2005) ￿nd that among Colombian households receiving remittances induce increases
in education expenditures.
For Mexico, Lopez-Cordova (2004) establishes using municipal data that a higher
incidence of remittances is associated with improvements in various indicators of
welfare. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of households receiving
remittances within a municipality is associated with a decrease of 5% in child mortal-
ity, a rise in school attendance of 4% and a remarkable fall in illiteracy of 40%. This
study is of particular interest because it considers the impact of remittances not only
on recipient households but also on nonrecipient household within the same munici-
pality. Hanson and Woodru⁄ (2002) used the 2000 Mexican Census to evaluate the
e⁄ect of remittances on accumulated schooling (number of school grades completed,
and not only number of years) by 10-15 year old, a critical age group. Their pre-
liminary results show that children in households with a migrant member complete
signi￿cantly more years of schooling, with an estimated increase that ranges from 0.7
to 1.6 years of schooling; interestingly, the gain is the highest for the categories of
children traditionally at risk of being dropped from school, i.e., girls and older chil-
dren (13 to 15 year old). These results are robust with respect to the identi￿cation
procedure (i.e., when migration is treated as endogenous) and the introduction of
dummy variables for Mexican States.
For El Salvador, Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) assess how remittances impact
upon educational outcomes for recipients. In particular, the improvements in re-
tention rates are quanti￿ed for pupils who come from households which receive re-
mittances. They estimate survival functions and show that remittances signi￿cantly
contribute to lower the hazard of leaving school. This e⁄ect would seem to be greater
in urban areas, but the mere fact of receiving remittances (irrespective of amounts)
is shown to have a very strong e⁄ect in the rural areas as well.
2.4 Remittances and Unemployment
The literature has also explored potential e⁄ects of remittances on labor market
outcomes in the country of origin of migrants. The most obvious e⁄ect that migration
from developing countries should have on the labor market in the home economy is
that, in itself, migration should lower the unemployment rate by reducing the supply
of labor. However, the relationship between migration and the labor market in the
labor exporting country is far more complex than this.
In particular, given that it is often the most skilled individuals who migrate, a
brain drain could negatively a⁄ect the labor market of the labor exporting country,
although more recent studies argue that the brain drain need not harm developing
7countries as the net e⁄ect of skilled migration could be brain drain (Stark et al., 1997,
1998 ; Beine et al., 2001).
The empirical literature has explored how labor market participation among re-
cipient households is related to remittances. Funkhauser (1992) notes that migration
and remittances can have two e⁄ects on participation decisions on the home coun-
try￿ s labor market. The loss of the migrant worker may mean that other household
members, in particular females, enter the labor market. However, the receipt of re-
mittances could reduce participation rates because of the income e⁄ect. He further
suggests that high levels of remittance ￿ ows into local labor markets may increase
aggregate demand and hence the demand for labor. Using data from El Salvador,
he ￿nds that remittances have a negative and signi￿cant in￿ uence on the labor force
participation of both males and females. However, he ￿nds that migrants do not have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on local labor markets. For females the positive but small e⁄ect of
the local labor market is enough to outweigh the negative remittance e⁄ect, but for
males, the negative income e⁄ect from remittances dominates all other e⁄ects.
Further evidence that remittances act in a similar way to welfare payments is
provided by Zachariah et al. (2001). They report that the worker-population ratio
was 55% amongst non-migrant households in Kerala but only 31.6% in households
with an emigrant. They suggest that this ￿nding may be caused by employment
seekers from emigrant households being more selective with regards to their job match.
Furthermore, they report unemployment rates of 20.8% and 8.1% for emigrant and
non-emigrant households respectively. They conclude their section on the e⁄ect of
migration on employment and unemployment with the comment ￿because unemployed
persons belonging to emigrant households enjoy the ￿nancial support of the emigrant
members, they are not in any hurry to get employed￿(p. 55).
The idea that unemployment insurance can improve productivity is theoretically
explained in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). They develop an equilibrium search
matching model with two-sided and ex-ante heterogeneity to obtain a distribution of
match productivity. An increase in unemployment bene￿ts acts as a safety net and
the unemployed wait longer for better matches. They ￿nd that in an economy with
higher unemployment bene￿ts there will be a higher unemployment rate but also a
better allocation of skills to jobs. In our context, workers may not only devote more
time to employment search, as result of receiving remittances, but also may invest in
skill upgrading to enhance job market prospects. Productivity may increase due to
both better skill matching and higher average human capital.
2.5 Remittances and Investment
It is also important to explore exactly how remittances are used in the home country.
The central issue here is whether there is a dual use of such resource transfers. On the
one hand, studies have suggested that migration, through remittances, have a positive
impact on consumption in the source country. Furthermore, if the majority of the
8money that is sent back is spent on goods and services, then remittances could cause
in￿ ation which could lead to excessive wage claims. On the other hand, remittances
can be equality enhancing and have a positive impact on the development of poor
areas, especially if they are invested in productive activities.
Several papers characterize the composition of spending of household receiving
remittances. Most studies have found that remittances are generally spent on con-
sumer goods such as food and clothes as well as housing, although there is a debate
over the extent to which they are used for productive purposes. Durand et al. (1996)
report that 10% of their sample of Mexican migrants to the US who reported that
they sent remittances or brought savings back with them spent at least some of the
saved/remitted money (i.e. migradollars) productively, 14% reported that they spent
some of their migradollars on housing and the remaining 76% reported that they
spent the migradollars only on consumption.
Glytsos (1993) estimates that only 4% of the estimated 14 billion drachmas sent
migrant remittances to Greece in 1971 was invested in machinery and another 4% was
invested in small shops, compared with 63% on consumption, 22% on housing and
7% on land. Using input-output analysis, he estimates that the multiplier e⁄ect as-
sociated with migrant remittances is 1.7 and this is found to vary between industries.
Multiplier e⁄ects are estimated to be highest in the apparel and footwear, leather and
electrical machinery industries and lowest in services. The author also estimates the
potential employment and capital e⁄ects of remittances amounted to around 74,000
new non-agricultural and non-public sector jobs and 8% of installed manufacturing
capacity.
Adams (1998) also ￿nds that external remittances have an important impact on
the accumulation of rural assets using Pakistani data and argues that the marginal
propensity to invest transitory income is higher than it is for labor income. Rozelle
et al. (1999) ￿nd that remittances help to loosen the constraints on crop produc-
tion in rural China and also stimulate productivity. Furthermore, given that many
Developing countries are likely to face capital and liquidity constraints, these con-
straints can be eased as a result of the savings that are deposited by migrants or their
families. Therefore despite the fact that only a small proportion of remittances may
be invested directly by migrants or their families, remittances can be channeled into
productive uses by the banking system.
Kule et al. (2002), summarize the results of two surveys carried out in Alba-
nia in 1998. The ￿rst of these was completed by around 1500 individuals about
their migration experience (of whom just under a half had migrated), whilst the sec-
ond contained questions which were directed towards ￿rms. Both of these surveys
contained information on remittances. The information provided in the ￿rst of the
surveys suggested that over 50% of the remittance sent to Albania were used for
consumption, and 30% were invested. The survey of ￿rms indicates that around 17%
of the capital required to establish a business came from remittances, which help to
overcome credit-constraints.
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tionship between migration and development by modelling the e⁄ects of short term
migration on labor productivity. Remittances can be channeled into investments
and increase productivity in the home economy. The authors study the impact of
migration and remittances on the employment performance of Central and Eastern
European Countries and claim that the main sources of the migrant￿savings from
overseas are used productively in the home country.
2.6 Remittances, Human Capital and Job Creation
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on matching theory has been silent
until now on the role of migration opportunities on the labor market performance of
the home country. In the absence of credit market imperfections, producers choose
the optimal level of investment and the introduction of new savings in the economy
does not have any e⁄ect on the output produced by each ￿rm. The introduction
of credit constraints generates new e⁄ects and creates a link between the literature
on matching theory and the one that investigates the e⁄ects of remittances on labor
exporting counties.
We provide a framework to explore how international remittances impinge on
human capital formation and the labor market. The presumption is that human
capital is the engine of growth, and that liquidity constraints a⁄ect on human capital
formation. The most commonly cited motivation to remit is simply that migrants
care of those left behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger kinship
and social circles. Alongside altruism, and notwithstanding self-rewarding emotions
associated with remitting behavior, the very fact that donors and bene￿ciaries of
remittances are spatially di⁄erentiated creates room for additional motives.
First of all, remittances may just buy a wide range of services such as taking
care of the migrants￿assets, with the likelihood and size of remittances depending on
whether and when the migrant intends to return. Secondly, it is clear that migration
is primarily (but not only) driven by wage di⁄erentials, implying that people are ready
to incur substantial moving costs in order to access to international migration. Such
migration costs, however, are beyond the possibilities of many prospective migrants
and, given capital markets imperfections, must be ￿nanced through informal family
loans repaid later (with interest) in the form of remittances.
Even when wage di⁄erentials are not signi￿cant enough to compensate for migra-
tion costs, it may still be optimal for some families to have migrant members. This
is the case, in particular, for rural households whose agricultural income is highly
volatile due to changing climatic conditions and other idiosyncratic risks. When the
market does not allow for a trade-o⁄ between a lower mean and a reduced variance,
migration by some members may become a straightforward way to achieve mutual
insurance; for this to occur, wages at destination need not be higher providing that
incomes at home and destination are not positively correlated.
10In the model, we assume that the driving motivation for remittances is altruism.
We focus on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of remittances as they impinge on households
decision in terms of labour supply, investment, education, and migration with poten-
tially important aggregate e⁄ects. The series of works highlighted above focused on
the impact of remittances, but they mainly emphasize a particular aspect of the in-
ternational transfers and are mostly con￿ned to e⁄ects on recipient households. Our
model considers the e⁄ects of remittances on both labor market prospects and human
capital formation for all households.
3 Model
Migration is characterized as a family choice and we show that repatriated savings
have an important role in the development process of the labor exporting country.
Migration decision is taken for the interest of the family. Positive selection is assumed
in that relatively more skilled workers have a higher propensity to migrate. This
assumption is coherent with the empirical evidence on migration and human capital
which shows that individuals with a higher educational level are more likely to migrate
(e.g., Chiquiar and Hanson, 2004; Gaviria, 2004).2
There is an ongoing debate on the impact of remittances on economic performance.
We look at the impact of intra-household transfers from migrants to stayers on the
decision making of stayers. In particular, we model the macroeconomic impact in
which schooling and labor supply prospects change in the presence of remittances.
3.1 Building Blocks
The theoretical framework is related to Drinkwater et al. (2003), but allowing for
human capital formation. The possibility of emigration in the short-run contracts the
supply of human capital as there is brain drain. However in the long-run there can
be three sources brain gain. First, migration opportunities raise the rate of return to
human capital investments by stayers. Second, remittances relax liquidity constraints
for recipients and reduce the costs of schooling. Third, higher human capital supply
by recipient households generates a job creation externality that may increase the
returns to schooling for nonrecipient households as well.
3.1.1 Preferences
The set up is a search model in which remittances a⁄ect the human capital and labor
supply in the source economy. We assume that the relatively skilled members of the
2For example in the AMCO survey, the majority of remittance recipients do not have schooling
beyond secondary education. This is is consistent with the presumption that migrants have at least
as much schooling as stayers.
11family are the potential migrants while the other members face frictions in the home
labor market. Each household has an utility function for the family of the form:
U(y;x;e) = ey + (1 ￿ e)x (1)
where e is the fraction of household members who are migrants, y is their disposable
income after transfers (including remittances), and x is the income for the stayers. In
the baseline model, we assume risk neutrality but later on examine how to relax this
assumption. Households compare the utility of the family with or without migration.
We then consider a matching model to describe the frictions in the labor market of
the source economy.
3.1.2 Technology




where the subscripts refer to the country where production takes place. We as-
sume that the only factor of production is human capital and that production is
subject to diminishing returns, with 0 < ￿ < 1. Furthermore we assume that for any
level of aggregate human capital the productivity parameter is larger in the destina-
tion country is higher, with Ad > Ao. This provides the rationale for migration as
migrants enjoy a wage premium which covers the costs of migration. Additionally,
the relative abundance of human capital in the destination country is assumed to









￿ is the cost of migrating.
3.1.3 Migration
The investment decision in human capital can be positively a⁄ected by migration
and remittances. The literature which stresses the possibility of a brain gain from
migration, shows that a positive, but su¢ ciently small, probability of migration to a
richer country raises the level of human capital investment in the source country (e.g.
Stark and Wang, 2001). We look at the impact of migration and remittances in a
framework where households can have individuals with low moving costs (potential
migrants) while the other members are characterized by high moving costs. We can
assume that migration of the ￿rst group of agents is freely determined by market
conditions while migration of the second group is regulated by the Government in
the destination country. The fraction of households with migrants is m.
The probability of migration for individuals with high moving costs (i.e. stayers)
depends on whether there is a migrant in the household. we assume that the fraction
of 1￿m households with no ￿rst wave migrants have very high migration costs such
12that their probability to migrate is equal to pnm while for households that receives
remittances this probability is equal to pm where pm ￿ pnm: For simplicity, let us
normalize pnm = 0 and pm = p: Our results do not require this dichotomy but
rather rely simply on the observation that households with migrants in the destination
country enjoy from network e⁄ects which facilitate further migration. Households
without migrants generally faces higher moving costs.3
3.1.4 Education
The timing of the economy is the following. The agents with low moving costs
migrate or stay. In case of migration they remit a given amount ￿. The migration
decision of the skilled and the probability p of migration of stayers a⁄ect the human
capital accumulation of the stayers and the labor market equilibrium in the source
economy. Now, we concentrate on the human capital investment of high mobility cost
individuals. Contrary to their partners, they face frictions in the labor market. They
meet a ￿rm with probability q, which is endogenous and described in greater detail
below. Their education choice is a⁄ected by domestic labor market conditions, the
probability to migrate and the labor market conditions in the destination country.
Stayers take migrant income and remittances as given and allocate resources to
schooling. Once abroad migrants remit an amount ￿. For simplicity, we assume that
they have the same ability to learn ￿ and that, if the partner migrates, they invest in
education a fraction of remittances equal to s. Since we assume risk neutrality and
the utility function is linear, the education decision is taken to maximize consumption










s.t. c = pi fAdh
￿
d + (1 ￿ s)￿ig + (1 ￿ pi)fq [Ao￿h
￿
o + (1 ￿ si)￿i] + (1 ￿ q)￿i (1 ￿ s)g (4)
where ￿ is the labor share in the country of origin We assume that ￿m ￿ 0, ￿nm = 0;
pnm = 0 and pm = p:

















3This characterization is consistent with the ￿ndings of Hanson, Robertson and Spilimbergo
(2002). Their evidence is consistent with border enforcement having a minimal impact on illegal
immigration, and illegal immigration from Mexico having a minimal impact on wages in U.S. border
areas. Hence, for a given human capital investment, the main determinant of the propensity to








Human capital accumulation is a positive function of the probability to migrate
p and of remittances. If we assume that part of the remittances are invested, then
households with a migrant member invest more in education compared to a non-
migrant household. Human capital accumulation is also a positive function of the
probability to ￿nd a job in the domestic labor market and of the workers￿bargaining
power. We can easily veri￿ed that if p = 1 recipient households invest for the foreign
market, while for p = 0 they invest in human capital for the domestic market.
We can then determine the average level of education in the source economy after
￿rst wave migration and remittances:
E (h) = (1 ￿ p)mhm + (1 ￿ m)hnm (7)
Clearly, the e⁄ect of migration and remittances on the average level of human capital
of the labor exporting country is ambiguous.
3.1.5 Labor Market





where v is the number of vacancies and L is the labor force in the origin country.
Upon ￿nding a job, workers receive a fraction ￿ of the revenue they generate,
wi = ￿ (Aoh
￿
i ) with i = nm;m (8)
We assume that the ￿rm does not know which type of worker will be matched
to a vacancy. When a vacancy is created, the decision is taken with respect to the
expected average level of education. Firms create vacancies up to the point where






where ￿ is the cost of creating a vacancy and q is the probability that it will
generate a match.
The average level of education in the economy will depend on the human capital
education decision of the stayers and on the e⁄ect of this education choice on future
brain drain. Given this assumptions, the expected level of human capital in the small
developing country will be equal to
E (h) = (1 ￿ p)mhm + (1 ￿ m)hnm (10)
14The de￿nition ￿ = v
u (the ￿ labour market tightness￿parameter) gives the vacancy









The average level of investment in human capital depends on the proportion of
households with migrants m, the amount of remittances invested in education per
recipient s￿, the probability of migration p, and the probability of ￿nding a job
q;given by
q (￿) = ￿




Similarly, we obtain the probability of a vacancy to meet a worker is the product
of the vacancies per job searcher times the matches per vacancy:










3.2 Analytical Solution: The Case without Brain Drain
Let us assume a simpli￿ed version of the model and look at the limit case of p = 0.
In this case, workers invest in human capital only for the domestic labor market. The









s.t. c = fq [Ao￿h
￿
i + (1 ￿ si)￿i] + (1 ￿ q)￿i (1 ￿ s)g
Optimal human capital investment is,
hi = [￿qAo￿(￿ + s￿i)]
1
￿￿￿ (15)
and given this, labor matching yields,
q













Thus we have two equations and two unknowns. First, the expected level of
human capital in the small developing country will be equal to
E (h) = m[￿￿Ao￿ (￿ + s￿)]
￿
















[￿Ao￿ (￿ + s￿)]
￿
￿￿2￿
These equations show that by inducing job creation, remittances enhance match-
ing prospects. The main conclusion of this exercise is to show that, even if we are
assuming away the possibility of brain gain through the migration prospects of re-
cipient households, remittances have a potentially positive impact also on the human
capital formation of the nonrecipient households.
This is due to an externality in the labor market. Remittances have a direct
positive impact on the human capital investment of recipient households and through
this channel increase the average level of human capital in the economy. Since ￿rms
open their vacancies as a function of the average expected pro￿ts, the rise in average
human capital induces job creation. In this way, remittances increase the probability
of employment of nonrecipient workers. The increase in labor demand in the source
economy will then in￿ uence the human capital investment decision of all workers. In
particular, the expected return to schooling is higher to the extent that remittances
enhance employment opportunities in the country of origin of migrants.
3.3 Extensions: Risk Aversion and Borrowing Constraints
We now turn to two extensions of the baseline model. The ￿rst is to relax the
assumption of risk neutrality. Second, we introduce the possibility of imperfect capital
markets.
3.3.1 The model with risk-averse workers
Risk-averse workers value remittances more if unemployed and the introduction of
these transfers modi￿es their outside option. Let ￿ z denote the domestic support
for the unemployed and ~ z denote income from remittances. Then zm = (￿ z + ~ z)
and znm = ￿ z are the unemployment incomes for the worker in a migrant and non-
migrant family respectively. Similarly, for the employed incomes are ym = (wm + ~ z)
and ynm = wnm. The remaining value functions which summarize unemployed and
employed workers￿asset values are then respectively
rU
i = ln(z














for a worker in a family of type i = m;nm says that the asset value of unemployed
worker of type i depends on the unemployment income and the probability of ￿nding
16a job, ￿q (￿) says that the asset value of employed worker of type i depends on the
employment income and the exogenous probability of losing a job, ￿.
We assume that ￿rms are not able to discriminate ex ante between an unemployed
migrant and non-migrant since only information concerning the average characteris-
tics of workers is available when the vacancy is opened. This implies that ￿rms will
open the same vacancy for the non-recipient and recipient unemployed. In the home
economy, households will bargain over two di⁄erent wages and the wage for work-
ers with migrants in the family will be higher than that of workers in non-migrant
families since they have a higher ￿ threat point￿ .
In equilibrium all ￿rms enter the market until the asset value from a vacant job,
V , is zero. By manipulating the two Bellman equations for the ￿rms and the zero
pro￿t assumptions, we can determine the job creation curve JC:
Ao[f(hi) ￿ (r + ￿)hi] ￿ wi ￿
(￿ + r)p￿
q(￿)
= 0; i = nm;m (21)
Aggregating over i = nm;m, applies to the average wage w = mwm + (1 ￿ m)wnm
as well. During the bargaining stage, the partners agree on a way to share the
rents. Wages are determined as the solution to a Nash bargaining problem. We now
concentrate on the expected values. Given that the ￿rm surplus is equal to F e￿V and








e ￿ V ]
1￿￿ ; i = nm;m (22)




w + ~ z
￿ z + ~ z
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ w) =
￿
w + ~ z
(23)
If we rearrange the free-entry condition
w =
pyq (￿) ￿ (r + ￿)￿
q (￿)
(24)
we can then write the following equation in function of ￿ :
ln
  pyq(￿)￿(r+￿)￿
q(￿) + ~ z








q(￿) + ~ z
(25)
To complete the matching model with capital, the evolution of unemployment is
given by
_ u = ￿(1 ￿ u) ￿ ￿q (￿)u (26)
In the steady state _ u = 0 and we arrive at the Beveridge Curve (BC):
u =
￿
￿ + ￿q (￿)
(27)
17We obtain steady-state values for ￿, w and u, where w is the average wage in the
economy and ￿ = v
u (the ￿ labour market tightness￿parameter) gives the vacancy rate.
3.3.2 Credit Market Imperfections
Without some constraint on the ability to raise ￿nance for investment, remittances
can a⁄ect the unemployment income, but they would have no e⁄ect on human cap-
ital. Firms would choose the optimal level of human capital at h = h￿ However, as
discussed in the introduction, the lack of formal channels to obtain credit that charac-
terizes many developing and transitional countries can generate ￿nancial constraints
for ￿rms. We therefore assume that households face liquidity constraints to ￿nance
human capital. With credit constraints h < h￿, remittances play a dual role. First,
they relax the constraints and enhance human capital accumulation opportunities.
To see this ￿ investment e⁄ect￿algebraically, we di⁄erentiate the equilibrium condition










































by noting that the denominator is always negative and the numerator is positive in
presence of credit constraints.
The second e⁄ect of remittances is to increase the search. The ￿ search e⁄ect￿can
























and the numerator can be both positive and negative. In particular, if ￿ is small
enough then the search e⁄ect is negative with d￿
d~ z < 0 and d￿
dh ￿ 0. We totally
di⁄erentiate equation to see these two e⁄ects analytically. We ￿rst concentrate on










pyq (￿) ￿ (r + ￿)￿
q (￿)
= A > 0
and,
q0 (￿)pyq (￿) ￿ q0 (￿)[q (￿)py ￿ p￿(￿ + r)]




= ￿ > 0
with
q






z + ~ z




z + ~ z
B
#
￿q (￿) + ln
"
A + ~ z
￿






























































Suppose that variables ￿, h and z refer to a post-migration state with remittances





Recipient households use remittances to overcome credit constraints.
4 Parameterization, Calibration and Simulations
In this section we parameterize the three groups of parameters in the model and
calibrate for El Salvador and Honduras.
4.1 Numerical Solution
The baseline model of the source economy is summarized as:











































q is the probability of employment in the source economy. Note that
remittance recipients always accumulate more human capital unless p = 0, as by
assumption Ad > Ao, ￿ < 1, and
￿
q < 1:Hence, in a sense, brain drain facilitates a
potential net brain gain from remittances.
4.2 Parameterizing the Baseline Model
The spirit of the analysis in this section is to value the quantitative impact of migra-
tion policies and remittances on the labor market of the labor exporting country. As
a ￿rst step towards an empirical analysis of our model, we require functional forms
for the matching and the production functions. In common with most authors we
specify a Cobb-Douglas matching function. So we can write j = L1￿￿v￿ and hence
q (￿) = ￿
￿￿1 , ￿q (￿) = ￿
￿:
Counting up across the model￿ s equations and the functional forms for the match-
ing and production functions we need to ￿nd values for a series of exogenous para-
meters. As a reference value we choose ￿ = 1:
This leaves us with the following aggregate parameters: ￿ (it is usually assumed
equal to 0.5 in the matching literature), ￿; Ao, Ad, ￿, ￿, and ￿. We use data for
ye = AoE (h￿), we = Ao￿E (h￿); m, p and ￿.
The cost of opening a vacancy ￿ can be obtained from:
￿ = ￿
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)AoE(h
￿)




w = argmax[E ￿ U]
￿ [F ￿ V ]
1￿￿
























E ￿ U =
ln(w + ~ z) ￿ ln
￿
￿
z + ~ z
￿




w + ~ z
￿
z + ~ z
#
(1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ w) =
￿
w + ~ z
and since
y ￿ w =
￿




w + ~ z
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q (￿)(r + ￿)
=
￿
w + ~ z
The next step requires a substitution of the wage derived from the free entry
condition:
w =
Aoyq (￿) ￿ (r + ￿)￿
q (￿)
We now have a relation which depends only on ￿
ln
  Aoyq(￿)￿(r+￿)￿
q(￿) + ~ z








q(￿) + ~ z
Our model is given by the following relations in the unknowns ￿;u and h:
ln
  Aoyq(￿)￿(r+￿)￿
q(￿) + ~ z












￿ + ￿q (￿)
(34)
f
0 (h) = r + ￿ (35)
4.2.1 Calibration Framework
The complete model, with remittances is summarized as:




WC : w = (1 ￿ ￿)z + ￿Ao + ￿￿ where (37)
z = ￿w + ~ z (38)






0(h) = r + ￿ (40)
Thus require functional forms and possibly some parameter values for q(￿) (from
m(u;v)) and f(h), and values for the following parameters in the model: p, ￿, ￿, ￿,
￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿.














= [1 ￿ exp(￿￿)] (42)
and for f(h) we choose
f(h) = Aoh
￿ (43)
4.2.2 The Calibration of Aggregate Parameters
We calibrate ￿ to data observations of u, v (and hence ￿ = v
u), denoted by ^ u, ^ v and
^ ￿), respectively. Then we have at the calibrated value:
￿ =
^ u^ ￿q(^ ￿)
1 ￿ ^ u
(44)
To calibrate ￿ and ￿, we use data for the distribution of output between wages
and the ￿rm￿ s economic rent. First write,




which decomposes output into the wage plus the ￿rm￿ s rent, this last term being
(r + ￿)J, where J is the value of an occupied job. Suppose we have data on these
components of output as shares of output; i.e., data on
(r+￿)J
Aof(h) = ^ R and w
Aof(h) = ^ W.
Next consider the calibration of ￿. We calibrate the model assuming no credit
constraints so that h = h￿. From our de￿nition of ^ R,
￿ =
q(^ ￿) ^ Rf(h￿)
(^ r + ￿)
(46)
22Since everything on the right-hand-side is calculated or observed at this point, we
therefore have a calibrated value of ￿.
Finally we calibrate ￿. Put z = ￿w in the pre-migration state and assume we
have data ^ ￿ for ￿. Let yn(h) = Ao(f(h) ￿ (r + ￿)h). Then from the de￿nition of ^ W,
we obtain the calibrated value of ￿ as
￿ =
(1 ￿ ^ ￿) ^ WAof(h￿)
h
y(h￿) + Ao￿^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ ^ WAof(h￿)
i (47)
Note that we can choose our units such that in this baseline calibration the produc-
tivity parameter Ao = 1.
For the calibration of the human capital formation parameters ￿ and ￿, we note
that





















and for a given value of the left hand side we ￿nd the values of ￿ and ￿ that satisfy
the equation given that all other variables are ￿xed and the parameters are calibrated.
We have that ￿ is a shift parameter indicates for the education cost function while ￿
indicates how fast marginal education costs rise with schooling attainment.
4.3 Policy Simulations
The household parameters for each country were derived from data from the AMCO
survey on migration and remittances. For the parameter m we used for each country
the share of households which receive remittances (20.1% of AMCO households receive
remittances). For the parameter s; we used the average reported share of remittances
spent on education (8.1% of remittances is spent on education). For the parameter e;
we used for the average fraction of household members who migrate within households
receiving remittances (1.2 migrants per household). For the amount of remittances
￿, we used the average monthly amount received (average monthly remittance is
U$293.6).
Among migrants, 87.7% have made only one trip. Among remittance senders,
66.6% emigrated after 1999, 79.8% remit with at least a monthly frequency, . Among
those sending remittances, 42.7% completed secondary education and 27.8% have ter-
tiary education, and 73.2% of migrants are legal residents of the destination country.
For AMCO households, 34% of remittances originate in the US and 54% in Spain.
Only 30.8 of recipients completed secondary education and more than 85% of re-
cipients are relatives, 80.1% close relatives of the sender. Also, 13% of remittance
23recipients are studying while 5% searching for a job. For recipients, the unemploy-
ment rate is 6.4%, with a 38.9% labor participation rate. In contrast, 13.5% is the
unemployment rate for nonrecipients, with 48.4% participation rate.
In Table 1, household parameters are summarized.
Table 1






For the purposes of the policy simulation exercises the model was solved calibrat-
ing the aggregate parameters as described above. The policy parameters are set on
the basis of subsidiary evidence. The main policy parameters are related to labor
market and education policies in the origin country of migrants and immigration pol-
icy in the destination country. These are calibrated in the context of each exercise.
For the baseline speci￿cations, we note from the study by Lora (2001) that the labor
markets in Colombia compared to the rest of Latin American are very ￿ exible in some
dimensions but relatively rigid in others. In the regional context, Colombia has the
lowest expected cost of laying o⁄ a worker, which is the termination cost below one
monthly salary without any provision for compensation, but has the third highest
nonwage labor cost component with social security contributions at 30% of the wage
bill.
Given this, the overall index of labor market reform for Colombia is about 0.7,
which is de￿ned relative to best practice in the region set equal to unity. And, from
Barro and Lee (1996) and Duryea and Pages (2003) we note that education access and
provision is limited even compared to other countries in Latin America, which as a
whole is a lagging region in the provision of education.4 For the migration propensity
parameter p, we note that the U.S. border controls are not necessarily the binding
constraint. Both Hanson et al. (2002) and Orrenious (1999) show that migrant
networks are more likely to in￿ uence this probability via migration costs than patrol
policies in the case of the Mexico- U.S. border.5
4Only in Sub-Saharan is the regional average of public expenditure in education per student
lower than in Latin America.
5Furthermore, as noted by Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), "whether by accident or design, U.S.
borders are porous. One common explanation for why the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which oversees the Border Patrol, fails to prevent illegal entry is that it operates under
con￿ icting mandates: while groups opposed to immigration demand strict enforcement, industries
intensive in manual labor demand that enforcement not undermine their economic viability."
24Since 1998 the annual out￿ ow of migrants oscillated between 200,000 and 300,000
and the population between 18 and 60 years old in 2003 was 26.643 million. This
means that about 1% of the population in that age group have migrated yearly.
This would give us a lower bound of the probability of second wave migration (i.e.
probability of migration conditional on another household member having migrated).
In Table 1 above, we impute p = 0:2
3 ￿ 0:07; from the fact that the average number
of migrants per household is 1.2 and that there are on average nearly 4 adults per
household.
4.4 Remittance E⁄ects and Education Policy
First, we compare the impact of remittances under varying degrees of education
access. The values in the column "Current" were generated by noting that in the
year 2000, according to Duryea and Pages (2003), in Colombia among the population
older than 25 years in 2000, the average years of completed schooling were 5.01 and
the fraction of individuals with secondary schooling was 18.5%.
In this case, ￿ and ￿ were calibrated to ￿t country speci￿c parameters using the
last equation in the previous section. The values in the column "LA Average" were
generated calibrating the parameters ￿ and ￿ using the Latin American averages
for years of schooling attained, which was 5.92 in 2000, and for the percentage with
secondary education, which was 21.77.
Table 2
E⁄ects of Remittance Funds for Schooling
under Di⁄erent Domestic Education Policies
Current LA Average
hm = 14:6573 hm = 16:4921
Current hnm = 3:8735 hnm = 6:1840
(s = 0:08) he = 5:0763 he = 7:1628
￿ = 0:5749 ￿ = 0:6522
hm = 15:4634 hm = 17:9574
Double hnm = 4:1509 hnm = 6:5378
(s = 0:16) he = 5:6185 he = 7:8689
￿ = 0:7764 ￿ = 0:8838
25Table 2 shows the impact of remittances on human capital and employment under
di⁄erent levels of access to education. Given the current level of remittances, to the
extent that there are job creation spillovers leading to improvements in schooling
for nonrecipient households, such e⁄ect would be more pronounced if education were
more accessible. If Colombia were able to achieve the average Latin American levels of
enrollment and schooling, there would be a proportionally more substantial increase
in schooling among nonrecipient households.
This is because households that receive remittances are partially able to overcome
education costs. In the meantime, households that do not receive remittances by and
large may ￿nd schooling investment prohibitive unless education policy is targeted to
enhance accessibility. Even if the rise in the supply of human capital by remittance
recipients increases the rate of return to education, the high cost of schooling can
preclude any investment by nonrecipient households.
Without more widespread access to education the potential impact of remittances
on aggregate human capital may not materialize. Table 2 shows what would happen
if the average fraction of monthly remittances devoted to education doubled. Under
the current level of accessibility to education, average human capital would increase
about 17% after the rise in remittances devoted to education. By contrast, if the rise
in remittances were accompanied by an increase in accessibility to education to the
Latin American average, aggregate human capital would rise by more than 56%, with
a particularly pronounced improvement among nonrecipient households. Hence, to
the extent that schooling is a⁄ordable, job creation spillovers materialize.
4.5 Remittance E⁄ects and Payroll Taxes
We note from the study by Lora (2001) that the labor markets in Colombia compared
to the rest of Latin American are very ￿ exible in some dimensions but relatively rigid
in others. In the regional context, Colombia has the lowest expected cost of laying o⁄a
worker, which is the termination cost below one monthly salary without any provision
for compensation. Yet, the payroll tax rate, for social security contributions, is third
highest in the region and after the reform of 1993 rose to more than 30%.
We consider how a decline in the payroll tax rate to the Latin American median
of 16% a⁄ects the macroeconomic impact of remittances. This declines lowers the
expected cost of ￿lling a vacancy, ￿
q(￿); which in equilibrium is the marginal product of
employing an additional unit of human capital. hence, job creation increases resulting
in more human capital formation and employment. Now, in the assessment of how
a doubling in the share of remittances devoted to education would impact on human
capital and employment, the role of payroll taxes is considered.
The aggregate impact of a rise in the share of remittances spent in education
under current levels of payroll taxes would be limited to an improvement on aggregate
human capital of about 5%. This compares to a rise of about 50% in aggregate human
capital if the rise in remittances invested in schooling were accompanied by a slashing
26in half of the payroll tax rate to the Latin American median. In the model, such a
reduction in payroll taxes by itself would generate a rise of 40% in long-run average
human capital formation through the virtuous cycle generated by the boost in job
creation.
Table 3
E⁄ects of Remittance Funds for Schooling
under Di⁄erent Domestic Payroll Tax Rates
Current LA Median
hm = 14:6573 hm = 16:4830
Current hnm = 3:8735 hnm = 5:2126
(s = 0:08) he = 5:1763 he = 7:0831
￿ = 0:5149 ￿ = 0:7950
hm = 15:1331 hm = 17:0843
Double hnm = 4:0713 hnm = 5:9571
(s = 0:16) he = 5:4810 he = 7:9826
￿ = 0:5925 ￿ = 0:8271
4.6 Remittance E⁄ects and U.S. Immigration Policy
We consider this a lower bound of the migration propensity. To ￿nd the lower bound of
the migration probability conditional on another household member having migrated,
we used the annual ￿ ow of emigrants and divided it by the stock of adult population,
both males and females, between 18 and 60 years old. For the baseline calibration we
set the probability of migration for households with ￿rst wave migrants to p = 0:07; as
described above the average number of migrants per household is 1.2 and that there
are on average nearly 4 adults per household:6 Now we turn to simulating would be
e⁄ect of two polar cases. First, we consider tightening up border control so that it
is not porous at all. In this case of a sealed border, all migrants are legal. From the
AMCO survey, we know that roughly 70% of ￿rst wave migrants are legal resident
of the destination country. Hence, psealed = 0:05: Second, we consider the impact of
6In the case of Mexican migrants, the evidence provided by Orrenious (1999) shows that, on a
￿rst trip, access to an additional family member network (a family member who has prior migration
experience) increases the annual probability of migrating from 1.9 to 4.8%.
27moving towards an open borders policy which largely reduces migration costs and
consider rise in the probability of successful second wave migration to pporous = 0:1.
Table 4
E⁄ects of Remittance Funds for Schooling
under Di⁄erent U.S. Immigration Policies
Sealed Border Porous Border
hm = 14:9113 hm = 14:1479
Current hnm = 4:1260 hnm = 3:9039
(s = 0:08) he = 4:8947 he = 4:4451
￿ = 0:6446 ￿ = 0:6041
hm = 16:2361 hm = 17:7450
Double hnm = 4:8632 hnm = 5:0326
(s = 0:16) he = 5:2571 he = 5:7246
￿ = 0:6752 ￿ = 0:7104
Table 4 shows how the impact of remittances may be a⁄ected by U.S. immigration
policy. While it is widely documented that border control per se has a marginal
e⁄ect on migration, relative to say family and village network e⁄ects, the polar cases
of eradicating all undocumented migration and making all migration legal would
plausibly a⁄ect ￿ ows. Compared to the benchmark in Table 2, with p = 0:07 and
current combination of education policy and payroll tax rate, limits on emigration
appear to enhance the impact of remittances on human capital and employment. The
reason is that, with costly education and labor market rigidity, remittances are used
to enhance migration prospects given limited opportunities at home. The selection
process associated with migration would make remittance recipients more likely to
leave and under these conditions opening of the border makes net brain drain more
likely.
Brain drain dominates when education access is limited and payroll taxes are high
because the e⁄ect of remittances on job creation in the local labor market is negligi-
ble. This is because while recipient households accumulate more human capital, they
do so in a very small scale due to the inaccessibility of education. The impact on
nonrecipient households is very limited because job creation externalities are negligi-
ble on top of the high costs of education. Given this, to the extent that there is more
human capital formation by recipient households it is with the purpose to migrate.
The net e⁄ect is brain drain.
28Yet, there is evidence that, under the present levels of education and job creation
costs, a rise in migration prospects tends to enhance the positive impact of remittances
on human capital and employment. In fact, when the border is porous there gains
from remittances, as Stark et al. (1997, 1998) and Bine et al. (2001) have pointed
out, better emigration prospects can raise the average level of human capital even if
some leave the country as the rate of return to human capital is higher.
Brain gain would be more important when education access is more widespread
and the labor market more ￿ exible because the e⁄ect of remittances on job creation
in the local labor market then is important. This is because when recipient house-
holds accumulate signi￿cantly more human capital, nonrecipient households engage
in schooling investments due to enhanced job creation. Increased human capital for-
mation by recipient households would be larger and not solely to migrate. The net
e⁄ect from education access and lower payroll taxes larger potential is brain gain.
5 Conclusion
The calibration exercises indicate that higher remittances are associated with a macro-
economic equilibrium where human capital formation by recipient households in-
creases. This observation is consistent with the evidence presented by Cardona and
Medina (2005) who ￿nd for Colombian households that emigration and remittances
help relax household credit constraints on the ￿nancing of education. In fact, remit-
tance recipient households spend on average 11% more on education. The schooling
investments ￿nanced with remittances not only enhance the earning prospects of re-
cipients at home and abroad but can generate job creation spillovers as businesses
post vacancies in reaction to the rise in the supply of human capital. This indirect
e⁄ect of remittances can potentially increase both human capital and employment
across all households as the labor market becomes thicker. Our contribution is to
consider the e⁄ects of remittances not only on recipient households but also the rest
of the economy using a macroeconomic model which we calibrate to data from AMCO
to conduct policy simulations. We identify potential gains from remittances on edu-
cation and employment but ￿nd that they could be much larger with more access to
schooling and less distortions in the labor market.
Our ￿ndings are also consistent with other studies which analyze the determinants
of remittances. Gaviria and Mejia (2005) study among Colombian emigrants what
are the determinants of remittances, the degree of attachment to their homeland,
and their desire to return. They use a survey conducted by Radiocadena Nacional
de Colombia linking the characteristics of migrants with those of household members
staying behind. The average amount of remittances is increasing in the years of
schooling of the senders and only decreases very slightly over time. Among receivers,
13.0% of households report investing remittances in education as their primary use.
Gaviria (2004) points out that remittances are an option for households with access
to the resources that need to be invested in human capital and to bear the costs of
29migration. This points to migration as an option for households, to enhance income
generation and risk diversi￿cation, which is subject to positive selection on the basis
that only those with a minimum human and ￿nancial capital can settle abroad.
Results consistent with the latter characterization are obtained by Soto and Walker
(2002), who analyze the motivations of Colombian migrants in the US. They ￿nd that
obtaining higher wages is the primary motivation. In fact, the evidence points to
positive self-selection of migrants as their schooling years and wage before migration
both exceed the national average.
The simulation exercises illustrate the positive role of remittances on aggregate
education and employment as a result of the decisions by recipient households. The
macroeconomic bene￿ts of remittances in Colombia would be much larger if progress
could be made in lowering the costs of education for households and the costs of job
creation for businesses. As with other capital in￿ ows, the extent to which remittances
are invested productively, and are catalysts to other investments, depends on the
￿ exibility that workers and businesses have to adjust their skills and scale of operation
to match each other in the market.
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